Keegan On The Mystery Of Iraq
John Keegan, to the uninitiated, is one of the finest living military historians; his The Face Of Battle: A Study Of Agincourt, Waterloo, And The Somme is required reading for anyone who wants to understand warfare, ancient or modern. He sums up the Iraq War to date succinctly here:
The mystery of the Iraq War is to explain how a brilliantly executed invasion turned into a messy counterinsurgency struggle. Part of the explanation, at least, is a lack of troops, a fault for which the Defense Department has been responsible. The current policy has its roots in the desire of Donald Rumsfeld, the defense secretary, to wean the Army away from its decades of indulgence, when it routinely planned to win conflicts by confronting enemies with mass–masses of soldiers, masses of equipment (particularly tanks and armored vehicles) and masses of ground-attack aircraft.
Mr. Rumsfeld disliked the concept of mass because it carried huge financial costs but also because it locked the Army into a style of war-making that sought victory through firepower rather than through speedy maneuver. He had supporters in the civilian side of the Pentagon, notably his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, and a man the rank below, Douglas Feith. Both also wanted to slim the Army down.
The result of their efforts to do so led to the expeditionary force sent to Iraq in 2003 being considerably weaker than that which had fought the Gulf War of 1991. The initial outcome, though, was similar: the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance at only slight cost in American lives, a result that seemed to justify Mr. Rumsfeld’s force policies and his belief that “speed kills.”
For several months the second Iraq War seemed a triumph. Then the American army of occupation, whose continuing presence was dedicated to the political transformation of the country, began to come under low-grade attack by Iraqi guerrillas. American soldiers began to die, and attempts to create a successor regime, organized on democratic principles, failed to take root. Political instability was accompanied by rising military difficulty, until by 2005 a full-scale insurgency was in swing, with dozens of American soldiers dying every month and the numbers of insurgents growing proportionately.
Keegan’s solution to the mystery is not of good cheer for those of us who care about a democratic Iraq:
America was so certain that what it had to offer–modern government in an incorrupt and democratic form–was so obviously desirable that it failed altogether to understand that the Iraqis wanted something else, which is self-government in an Islamic form. It is too late now to start again.
All that can be hoped is that the U.S. Army will prevail in its counterinsurgency and…it may still…American soldiers know combat secrets that their enemies do not and cannot match. Whether pure military skills will win the war, however, cannot be predicted.
It should be noted, particularly for regular readers who have no doubt noticed a decidedly more pessimistic tone from this blog lately, that nothing Keegan says invalidates the nobility of the enterprise; it merely explains its possible failure. Increasingly, Iraq does look like a failure – I’m not too blind to see it.
That doesn’t mean I don’t support the decision to keep trying, nor does it mean I regret my initial support for the war. It does mean, however, that we have to consider a shakeup (at least that’s increasingly my view). More on that later, no doubt; if not today, then soon…
The only problem we’re left with is figuring out how to achieve victory. The Democrats don’t seem to care about winning and the Republicans have proven incapable of winning. Rock, hard place.
I don’t know where everyone got the idea that the definition of success in Iraq is Shia’s and Sunni’s sitting around singing kumbaya. It’s not going to happen. It never was going to happen.
Freedom does not produce nirvana any more than tyranny produces nirvana. All freedom does is allow people more control over their own destiny. Murderers may choose to murder and vigilantes may choose to avenge murders. With enough time, and it may take decades, a system of justice will take hold as long as some of the brave are willing to risk death to protect freedom. Growing pains are part of the process.
If the day comes when a tyrant is able to totally prevent the loss of life in Iraq, I will consider our effort in Iraq a complete failure. As long as Iraq citizens can choose their leaders and their own destiny, I will consider our effort in Iraq a success, regardless of the chaos.
Because of our intervention, they may have to undergo the civil war that both sides (seemingly) have desperately wanted for many generations – so be it. I think if Bush had replaced Rumsfeld earlier in his second term we may have had the opportunity to change course and tactics, but it seems that we’re stuck with his policies from here on out, do or die.
May I also suggest another impressive historian who’s living presently, Victor Davis Hanson. Here are his latest thoughts on the situation:
http://www.victorhanson.com/index.html
David, you make a point that should be obvious, but still eludes most of us: the Sunni/Shia animosity–the virulence of which is all too obvious–goes back to the time of Mohammed himself. Trying to apply reason to any religion is futile because religions are by definition based on faith. And to think that the imposition of a particular form of worldly government will solve a faith-based conflict that goes back 1500 years is pretty ridiculous.
As for Iraq..watch the Kurds. If they start a move to independence it will be the best indicator of how a neutral, but affected, party sees the current situation.
The one fact that no one discusses when comparing Iraq I and iraq II-the military budget. It is one/third the size it was during the first conflict.
Not enough troops in Iraq? Is it really Rummy’s fault? Where are the troops that he was supposed to call on? You’d think a demcrat would offer that we have 100,000 sitting around waiting to be deployed. When he was talking about changing the military, Rummy realized that we didn’t have the number of soldiers to keep our previous tactics.
his quote-”you go to war with the army you have” rankled a lot of people, but it was the closest we have come to the honesty of the situation.
As for having more troops-who believed that we would still be going it alone? The UN was there…and then backed out. Nato? nope. I guess I could blame bush becuase he ‘alienated the world’, but if foreign policy of our allies is determined by whether they like a president, and not out of responsiblity to help what they deemed a worthy cause, even if disagreeing with the invasion.
The world played coy. ‘We might help you,if you give us this much money or control in Iraq.’ Kerry wouldn’t have illicited anymore help from these opportunists. Iraq was an opportunity to a large part of the world and they have chosen their postion of advantage.
The author you presented seems to believe that the nature of the war and its aftermath was controlled by Rummy. He moves the pieces he has, but the lack of US troops and global assistance which are two very large pieces that were present in the first Gulf War. It is a dishonest comparison.
What would like to say, but never can:
If people are wondering why we have guys pulling four tours, you should ask your congressmen why we aren’t as big as we used to be. Congress is completely insane. We vote on which bases we should continue to close down here, to keep in line with the budget, but we have 35k in South korea, sitting ducks all, and we have 70k in Germany- (but when you add in the 40,000 support and family present, we provide a city with 110,000 americans to support the local German economy). The troops in Germany are to defend against the Soviet Union, the country that no longer exists and whose demise justified their budgetary cuts over the past 10 years.
Insane.
that was supossed to be:
What *Rummy* would like to say, but never can:
“When he was talking about changing the military, Rummy realized that we didn’t have the number of soldiers to keep our previous tactics.”
While the end is the same – not enough troops for Iraq – I think you have the cause and effect backwards. Rummy’s strategy in Iraq was based on the military principle he believed in: “speed kills”, not simply a reaction to the resources he had available to him.
And you are correct, the restructuring of the military, including the reduction in total active duty troops, has been going on a long time and supported by both parties.
What kind of revenue benefit does Germany get?
let’s say a thousand dollars a head-which is modest, and it is 1.1 billion dollars…per year.
I am understating the financial hit we take by letting this happen, but how much more money do we need to lose to support an ‘ally’ who really does give a flying f*** about us?