More Woodward=Bad News For Rumsfeld
Say what you want about Bob Woodward, I think he is generally – generally, mind you – accurate, and Donald Rumsfeld is coming out smelling like a – well, like the opposite of a rose – in the excerpts we have so far from State of Denial
There was constant tension between the NSC and Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, and Rumsfeld went to extra lengths to keep control of information. Often, when Rumsfeld came to the White House with Gen. Tommy R. Franks to brief the president, the NSC and some of the staff on the Iraq invasion plans, he would see that the slides and handouts were distributed just before the meeting and taken back immediately after.
Sometimes there would be a handout for the president with 140 pages, and the lesser beings like Miller would only be allowed to see 40 of them. On one occasion, Rumsfeld came to a meeting without enough briefing packets for all the principals, so Rice wound up looking on with the person next to her.
Sometimes, Rumsfeld would point across the room in the middle of a briefing. “People shouldn’t be taking notes,” he scolded. “People should not be taking notes in here.”
When the generals came over to the White House with him, Rumsfeld spoke first, introducing everyone and explaining what they were going to talk about. It was worse for Gen. Richard B. Myers, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Miller and Myers were longtime friends, and Miller could see that Myers was suffering.
At times Rumsfeld would not return Rice’s phone calls when she had questions about war planning or troop deployments. She complained to Rumsfeld, who reminded her that the chain of command did not include the national security adviser.Rice complained to the president.
Bush’s response was to try to be playful with Rumsfeld.
“I know you won’t talk to Condi,” Bush once teased Rumsfeld, “but you’ve got to talk to her.”
Admonishing people for taking notes? On such an important subject? Not talking to Condi? And the generals…well, see for yourself:
Rumsfeld’s relationship with his own generals only worsened.
In the summer of 2005, Marine Corps Gen. James L. Jones, the NATO commander, paid a call on his old friend Gen. Peter Pace, then the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was virtually certain that Pace was going to move up to replace Myers as chairman, the top position in the American military.
Jones expressed concern that Pace would even want to be chairman. “You’re going to face a debacle and be part of the debacle in Iraq,” he said. U.S. prestige was at a 50- or 75-year low in the world. He said he was so worried about Iraq and the way Rumsfeld ran things that he wondered if he himself should not resign in protest. “How do you have the stomach for eight years in the Pentagon?” he finally asked.
Pace said that someone had to be chairman. Who else would do it?
Jones did not have an answer. “Military advice is being influenced on a political level,” he said. The Joint Chiefs had improperly “surrendered” to Rumsfeld. “You should not be the parrot on the secretary’s shoulder.”
Pace became chairman, and later flatly denied that Jones had told him that Iraq was a debacle. “He’s a good friend. He was in my wedding,” Pace said, noting they had known each other for 36 years. “If Jim felt that way he would tell me.”
I called Jones at NATO headquarters in Belgium. He said that he had made all those comments to Pace in their meeting in 2005. “That’s what I told him,” he said.
Look, I know Decision ‘08 readers don’t speak with a monolithic voice, and I love that. I also know that I haven’t convinced very many of you that Rumsfeld should resign. That’s fine. I know some of you think the occupation went as well as could be expected, all things considered, and others who think we made some terrible mistakes might finger a different culprit.
But if, like me, you think the occupation was botched pretty horribly, the buck has to stop somewhere, and that somewhere has to be somewhere pretty high up the chain. And in my humble opinion the buck stops at:
(a) Rumsfeld, for his apparent inability to adapt to the advice of the people on the ground who warned him that we didn’t have enough troops to get the job done, and
(b) Bush, for keeping him long after it appears to have become apparent to almost everyone around him that Rumsfeld was an obstacle to progress.
That’s just the way I see it; dissenting views are, of course, both appreciated and respectfully considered…
“On one occasion, Rumsfeld came to a meeting without enough briefing packets for all the principals, so Rice wound up looking on with the person next to her.”
The implication of this is that the principals that were meeting, all felt that they were more important than rice. At the time Rice was over ‘National’ Security and IRaq was fell into the non-national category.
The overall implication of Condi’s role is best summed up by the above quote:
“She complained to Rumsfeld, who reminded her that the chain of command did not include the national security adviser.”
If rummy was wrong in this assumption, it was Bush’s responsiblity to correct this. Interesting that much of Woodwards work, cited so far, mentions nothing of Cheney’s role.
I know, I know-the buck stops with Rumsfeld, and if he is fired, all the things that have gone wrong will be better. To this day I still don’t understand conservatives, who can find flaws with Rummy, but ignore the fact that he attempted to resign twice, and remained with the full support of Bush/Cheney.
Heaping responsiblity on Rummy, is a plan for diverting ‘all that has gone wrong’ from bush. If the case was made that Rummy kept Bush in the dark, we would have a problem. Since it hasn’t, they are inseperable.
I think I’ve been pretty consistent in calling for Rummys ouster, mostly on political grounds. Doing so would bolster the President’s political position by taking away a target of attack from his opposition (anti-war Dems). It would also allow Bush to change course without having to admit some sort of tactical or strategic defeat. Making this sort of calculated political move would be negated on practical terms, however, if Rummy were understood to be doing a stellar and/or exemplary job. But it isn’t because he isn’t.
I think the simple explanation is that Bush is overly loyal to those he trusts and that are loyal to him.
Well, mtl, I appreciate your position; I don’t think the sun would suddenly break out from the clouds and all would be well with Rumsfeld gone; however, one question that we asked when talking about this before was, if not Rumsfeld, who?
The Woodward book says McCain, Lieberman, and James Baker were all considered (by Andy Card, at least)…I would have loved to have seen any of them take over the effort…now, however, for various reasons, I think the door has slammed shut on certainly the first two, and possibly all three…
William Cohen, Sam Nunn, or John Abizaid
I’ve been hoping for Eric Shinseki since December 2004. It could be viewed either as an apology — “You were right and Rummy was wrong; we’re sorry we listened to him and not you.”(this is the stance I take) — or a challenge — “Okay, if you’re so smart, let’s see you do any better.”
“It would also allow Bush to change course without having to admit some sort of tactical or strategic defeat.”
the implication of this is that bush does not have say on Iraq, and would need to fire rummy, to get control back.
This is the political ‘gestalt’ argument. If you get rid of the perceived ‘negatives’ of a story, what remains will be positive…
Iraq is the sum total of events, not something that can piecemealed.
Oh pu-leze. Not William Cohen!!! The only thing he did right was, ah, um, what was the question again?
I’ll go along with Sam Nunn, but bearing in mind that Les Aspin and Sam are two hawks of a feather. Les was good, just not great and certainly unimaginative.
Abizaid? Perhaps… But then again, what’s really needed is someone from the big biz sector that understands the military. Not a career politician (William/Sam), nor ex-career military.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t there some sort of prohibition on naming flag officers as SecDef? I seem to recall that there was some sentiment for naming Norman Schwarzkopf to the post after Gulf War I, but it never went anywhere because he would have required an exemption of some kind from Congress. Or maybe I’m just mis-remembering something said about the standard confirmation process.
I still like Sam Nunn, if he’d take the job.
Eric who? Shinseki?
The one who squashed armored tactical vehicles during development and trial fielding? Decided that morale would best be bouyed by making the black beret (made in China) a mandatory part of uniform? Decided that the Army needed a new slogan–”Army Of One”?
He hasn’t been right about anything fundamental or imagining future threats. Oh, did I mention that he likes big heavy guns, as in artillery? We saw how useful there were, NOT, both in the Balkans and in Iraq.
Anyone can say “we need more troops” but that wouldn’t make them right, just as anyone can say “we need fewer troops” and that wouldn’t make them wrong. You have to look at the whole logic train and weigh the pros & cons.
IOW, one could take either position and suceed or could fail depending on the details. That said, Shinseki isn’t and shouldn’t be anyone’s candidate.
You’re right, fatman, the Secretary of Defense MUST be a civilian (I think this is even constitutional, but I could be wrong)…
Well, maybe it’s not constitutional, after all…good discussion here, though…
[...] How long does the party of “stay the course, even although we have brought things to this violent, fractured, unpromising, unending situation,” deserve my vote? If there is any magic formula, some way out (not that I can see one), at this point I have zero confidence in Bush’s and Rumsfeld’s ability to find it. Mark Coffey seems to agree. [...]
Why stop at Bush? Why not go all the way to the top? Fire Cheney!
What about Thomas PM Barnett? Anyone else read the Pentagon’s New Map?
I have not…but I take it you recommend it?…
Aaron, I don’t think I’ve ever come across Thomas PM Barnett, so I looked up his website. hanks for the heads-up.
As near as I can tell, he sees the military as being transformed in a way never seen before.
Personellwise, He sees the ranks made up of professional soldiers who are ‘remote’ from the civilian experience and the citizen soldier — a civilian called to fight, but would return to his day-job once released.
Organically, although I haven’t seen it expressed yet on his website, I rather suspect that he also sees the military comprised of two players: The Warfighter, anyone not directly pertaining to fighting is not a warfighter, everyone else is in support operations.
The notion that non-warfigthers need not be soldiers continues to gain ground, especially when looked at from cost-benefits & effectiveness. Issues still to be resolved could best be summed up as the “contractors in the battlefield” dilemna.
That said, I believe I mentioned it before elsewhees here, but I think Rummy is getting a bum-rap. Mark, your criticisms are valid, I just don’t think that it rises to the point of pushing him out. I think history will prove Rummy right with regards to the core transformation, and that includes making the DOD/Pentagon hostile to “Luddites” as it were.
To push him out, short of concrete evidence of malfeasance or incompetence, would be to set the DOD back in ways unforseeable — namely ‘doing things the way we’ve always done it’. Keep that in mind whenever you hear of people whining in the press that Rummy is a meany and/or incompetent. Odds are they couldn’t cope with thinking outside the box or letting go of cherished projects.
Later
Ditto Andy – I’ve yet to hear a coherent and convincing argument as to why Sec. Rumsfeld has not been a historic and transformational Sec. of Def. Political calculations are garbage – I love this tough, smart, and effective man in charge. He’s the adult – the whiny kids should grow up.
Well, God knows I’m not an expert on military organization – I hear what you’re saying. I don’t think he’s a bad guy, or that he has been an unqualified disaster…just that I think we could stand a change, that’s all…
Yeah; it was a pretty good book — mostly about attempting to define the threat facing America today — it’s along similar lines to the Lexus and the Olive Tree by Friedman or Jihad vs. McWorld (I forget the author on that), in defining the world in terms of globalization or lack thereof instead of Communism vs. Capitalism of the Cold War. It is more security/military-oriented than what I assume the others to be, though.
His plans for the Pentagon were to essentially create two seperate organs for two seperate purposes — a “Leviathan” to topple bad regimes and take care of “basket-cases” like Haiti and Somalia, and a “Systems Administrator Force” as a regime-builder. Right now, as we’ve seen in Iraq, the US military is very good at the former, but less than efficient at the latter.
Mark, Andy and Aaron, I picked up Barnett’s new book, Blueprint For Action, while in San Antonio last weekend and know it will be as interesting as The Pentagon’s New Map. I think it takes Barnett’s realistic understanding of our new world, with functioning core, non-integrating gap, connectivity and disconnectedness, and gives us a road map to what Barnett calls “a future worth creating”.
For what it’s worth, you must be retired for 10 years from the active military to become SECDEF. Mr. Rumsfeld was still in the reserves when he served under President Ford.
I will say that from the excerpts of the book that I’ve read, I think it’s a little odd that someone who had offered to resign twice (and so wasn’t completely adverse to the notion) survived a joint attack by the WH CoS, the NSA, her deputy, the Secretary of State and the dearly beloved First Lady. And that the end result was the Secretary of State got sacked and the NSA (who was lobbying the dismissal of the SECDEF) got promoted. And went on to work closely with the SECDEF. Odd indeed.
Mark, it might surprise you to learn that I’m not adverse to change. I would even posit that Mr. Rumsfeld is not adverse to change if there’s something material to be gained from the change. But there’s nothing particularly convincing or compelling here that recommends change for change’s sake given what’s at stake, and as those who are conversant with the transformation process are pointing out, it’s more than troop numbers in Iraq. Not unless you have a replacement who will be up to speed in less than a year, and the only such candidate I can think of is Cheney.
“How long does the party of “stay the course, even although we have brought things to this violent, fractured, unpromising, unending situation,” deserve my vote?”
using the phrase ’stay the course’ for opponents of the war is a cop out.
We have changed strategy and assets so many times that what is lost in the phrase is that there have been hundreds of decisons with postive and negative results.
Bush using the phrase-stay the course-is basically saying we chnage as quickly as we can to adapt.
An opponent of the war-using ’stay the course’-means they don’t know any specifics and are trying to appear up to speed.
Can anyone explain to me what ’stay the course’ actually means to them?
AE, thanks for that clarification – I know Rumsfeld’s your guy, so it pains me to be critical (I like the guy, on a personal level – you know how it goes)…
Mark, I actually think I know the reason for your and fellow compatriot’s maliase & pessimism.
It’s been a long ime since you’ve taken a daily dose of “Good News From Iraq”. We don’t need to find a replacement for Rummy, we need a replacement for CHRENKOFF!!!
As you know, I recently returned from Iraq after a year. If you think that we were lean & mean, brother, you have no idea what’s coming down the pipeline. We are gathering so much lessons learned that it will take years to test, validate & incorporate them into our doctrine. Clauswitz would be so jealous.
Rumsfeld was correct when he more or less said you deal with the army you inherit. To his credit, he isn’t/hasn’t thrown up his hands in hopeless frustration.
Transformation is simply the biggest thing to ever happen to a legacy infrastructure. It would be tough to do even in a peacetime environment. Without a doubt, just as IT has transformed many businesses, the military is likewise leveraging that in ways unimagined for most folks even a few years ago.
Bottomline, if it wasn’t for Rumsfeld’s resoluteness in transformation, the younger cream of the crop wouldn’t have been able to flow their innovative ideas up the chain. Instead, the DOD would have reverted to their complacent “paleo-Powellian” might thru large forces mantra.
Normally I would agree with the notion that change for the sake of a fresh face can be good. But in this case, more particularily when one evaluates the alternate candidates, better to stick with the ‘progressive’ guy at the top. Of course there will be hits and misses–along with varying mileages–but until one actually tries, you just don’t know what works or doesn’t.
As for myself, I’d rather go with the leader that allows and empowers individuals to try anything and fail, than one where everyone is afraid of the bold & unorthodox.
Well, of course, I appreciate that your opinion is coming from actual experience in Iraq, so far be it from me to argue with you. My viewpoint is necessarily one that is gathered from whatever I can glean from magazines, books, news reports, etc., so I appreciate you sharing that with us…
And you’re right, we do miss Chrenkoff…
[...] It should be no surprise after the House was gutted of Republicans. Only surprise is that Bush let him. He has tried before. Bush called Rumsfeld a trusted friend and patriot who had served his country well. [...]