Informed Speculation

To counter the pessimism of my previous post, I present you with this lengthy defense of the ‘consensus’ solutions being leaked from the Iraq Study Group and speculated upon by Gregory Djerejian of the Belgravia Dispatch.  If one were a cynic (who, me?), one might call the following a bit utopian:

With the nomination of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense, the important role of the Baker-Hamilton Commission in forging a new approach in Iraq becomes even clearer. Gates was formerly one of the principals of the Commission, and now finds himself thrust into a critical policy-making role, one where he might well end up implementing some of the Commission’s recommendations. The challenge that James Baker and Lee Hamilton (the co-chairs of the so-called Iraq Study Group (“ISG”)) must now grapple with is how to forge a bipartisan consensus on Iraq policy. Without one, the Commission will not be able to issue a recommendation that meets with the approval of all the Commission members (who range from Democrats like Leon Panetta and Vernon Jordan, on the one hand, to Republicans like Ed Meese and Alan Simpson on the other). The goal is clear: recommend a credible and actionable game plan on how to move forward, while helping a divided American nation find broad, if elusive, consensus regarding what to do next in Iraq.

A huge challenge, to be sure, but the good news is that the last best hope for Iraq might well involve a mixture of policy positions some of which are popular with Democrats and others with Republicans. For instance, the Democrats (not to mention quite a few non-ideological Republicans) will find engaging Syria and Iran in high-level, direct talks of interest. In addition, an attempt to provide deeper autonomy to the main Iraqi groups in relatively secure, organized manner will appeal to leading Democratic foreign policy players like Richard Holbrooke who have been influenced by Les Gelb’s calls for an Iraqi confederation. Republicans, on the other hand, will find talk of bolstering the remnants of central authority in Baghdad of interest, so as to keep alive the prospects of a unitary state, as well as increasing troop deployments in Baghdad, so as to not have to rotate forces out of Anbar Province. And both Democrats and Republicans will find some common ground with regard to embedding more U.S. military advisors with Iraqi units to enhance the training and equipping effort, hammering out an oil revenue sharing protocol among the key Iraqi constituencies, working to better disarm and disband the militias, more attentively monitoring growing Turkish-Kurdish tensions, and more comprehensively backstopping national reconciliation efforts.

The most contentious issue, of course, will be what to do with the approximately 140,000 troops in Iraq. Some observers, including this one, believe that forces must be increased by not fewer than 30,000-50,000 additional men, at least so as to provide for a temporary massive ‘surge’ style operation in Baghdad. This, however, not only will put greater strain on the military, but also will be hugely controversial with Democrats who see their victory in the recent elections as a mandate to begin troop withdrawals in Iraq. To persuade the Democrats to entertain introducing greater troops into Iraq, so as to have a fighting chance to re-assert order in Baghdad (an absolutely critical goal)–the Baker-Hamilton Commission will likely have to introduce the notion of benchmarks–so that Democrats can point to achievement of certain goalposts as constituting conditions for continued deployment of significant numbers of troops.

No cure for cancer while we’re at it?  This is all well and good on a theoretical, goal-setting level, but how the hell do you get to implementation, particularly when there is a sovereign, increasingly unfriendly Iraq in the way?

As to what can be accomplished negotiating with Iran and Syria:

Many readers ask: what will we gain from direct discussions with Syria and Iran? I can think of several actions, without limitation, that the Syrians could take if we extended various carrots to them (such as facilitating a return to negotations with the Israelis over the Golan Heights issue), including: 1) making the Syrian-Iraqi border less porous, 2) reducing Iraqi Baath money floating about Syrian banks and thus ultimately getting to insurgents, 3) cutting down on former deviationist-type Iraqi Baath who fled to Syria during Saddam’s regime trying to cut a non-Saddamite, neo-Baath resurgence in Iraq, and 4) inducing Damascus to be more cooperative with Maliki’s government so as to help stabilize the national government in Baghdad. As for the Iranians, it’s no secret they are hedging their bets and, not only supporting Shi’a militias, but also Sunni insurgents. Similar inducements (mixed with the specter of punitive actions) could get the Iranians to reduce support to some of the groups causing us the worst problems, whether Sunni or Shi’a. Neither Damascus nor Teheran want a total meltdown in Iraq–which would also involve large refugee flows to both their countries–countries with their own somewhat disgruntled minorities (Azeris in Iran) or indeed majorities (Sunnis in Syria). In diplomacy, as in life, you talk to your opponents on occasion to get results. Hope and ‘they know what to do’ isn’t a plan.

Whether this is reasoned optimism or the wild-eyed variety I leave each of you to decide on your own…