The President’s Strategy: The PowerPoint
Those of you who sit in business meetings will appreciate this link from the White House that attempts to present the new strategy in Iraq in bullet-point form, including:
The President’s New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:
- Let the Iraqis lead;
- Help Iraqis protect the population;
- Isolate extremists;
- Create space for political progress;
- Diversify political and economic efforts; and
- Situate the strategy in a regional approach.
The political component that I have been so concerned with is addressed here:
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political
Iraqi:
- The Government of Iraq commits to:
- Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
- Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
- Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.
- All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
- Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.
Coalition:
- Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
- Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
- Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
- Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
- Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
- Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
- Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
- Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
- Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
- Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq’s communities on an impartial basis.
Finally, I excerpt the section dealing with Iran and Syria and other regional players:
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional
Iraqi:
- Vigorously engage Arab states.
- Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
- Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
- Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party).
Coalition:
- Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
- Increase military presence in the region.
- Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
- Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
- Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
- Continue to seek the region’s full support in the War on Terror.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
- Focus on the International Compact.
- Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.
It’s a decent plan – the twin questions of Maliki’s cooperation and troop levels remain, but at least the right points are being emphasized…
There’s also the question of what consequences there are for the Iraqi government if they don’t hold up their end of the bargain. According to point #4, rather than putting pressure on the nascent Iraqi government, we’re “[creating] space for political progress.” Has that space not been there? Has there been pressure applied of which I’ve been unaware, such that giving them space is an acceptable alternative?
It’s a legitimate question; I suppose ‘creating space for political progress’ might be interpreted as ‘we’re not going to openly advocate for the overthrow of Maliki if he starts flying right’…
I just…..it’s like all this talk of benchmarks. They’re really just goals, since there’s no consequences for not reaching them. Then they’d be deadlines. I guess “benchmark” just means “something we’d really like to do, but which we’re not going to hold ourselves to too strictly.”
“creating space for political progress” could refer to simply giving the Maliki government the latitude to achieve the objective of a stable and significantly less violent Iraq with few or any proscribed approaches. I do agree that this latitude must be granted only in exchange for agreement on the objective and the timetable (deadline is the word I would choose too) for achieving it. The consequences could and should be as simple as: we’re leaving after a certain amount of time, either way. I do think it has come to that.
If we accept that Iraq is in the middle of a civil war – sectarian violence if you prefer – then we need also accept that it is only they, and not us, that can fix it. We are committed to assisting, but only for a reasonable amount of time.