However, let us stipulate for the moment that Jacques has the right theory, at least for the sake of argument: today’s bloodbath would be an ominous sign that Sunni extremists can still easily penetrate government security – and thus open the door again to unofficial ‘protection’.

One bad day, even one with many dozens dead, is probably bearable in a country that already has borne so much…but let’s all cross our fingers and hope that this doesn’t begin to repeat itself again…

The Mahdi Army’s “use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/world/middleeast/27mahdi.html?ref=world

I’m not disputing the other causes which Jacques cites — doubtless they all overlap to some extent — but violence and extortion (at least according to the Times) is a primary cause of their fading fortunes.

Another factor is suggested by a front page New York Times article today on the fading fortunes of the Mahdi Army.

Actually, no.

The important development on that front was Moqtada al Sadr’s declaration of a unilateral cease-fire at the end of August 2007 (subsequently, extended for another 6 months). There was an immediate, and precipitous decline in the level of violence, when that happened.

The other oft-cited factor was the Sunni Awakening movement, which started in the Fall of 2006 (i.e., pre-Surge).

The recent decline in the influence of the Mahdi army (if, indeed, that NYT article turns out to be correct) would be heart-warming. But it’s more likely a consequence, rather than a cause, of the decline in violence.

One of the main products of the “Surge” has been the Shiitification of Baghdad. Now that they no longer have to fear the depredations of Sunni militias, the Shiite residents of Baghdad no longer feel the need for the “protection” offered by the Mahdi army. That (as the NYT article tangentially points out) is the most likely reason for its decline in influence.

While you acknowledge that there are multiple causes, John McCain does not. Nor does the Wall Street Journal. My point is simply that the equivalence of the surge and the improvements in Iraq is facile and misleading.

1) If you are going to compare the candidates based on their judgment, I would prefer a candidate who had the prescience to advocate staying out of Iraq in the first place to one who enthusiastically supported the invasion (and who calls for a one hundred year presence there). In my view, this is a much better criterion than whether a candidate’s crystal ball can accurately predict what expectations we should have for a troop increase.

2) Those who claim that the surge is an unqualified success can only claim that the decrease in violence and the escalation occured over roughly the same time frame. Other factors — such as cash payments to the Sunnis, conflicts between local Sunni and foreign Al Qaeda, and the quiescence of al Sadr — also presumably contributed to the diminution of violence. Nor is there any guarantee that the relative peace will continue. Doubtless the increase in American troops contributed to decreasing violence, but it certainly is not the only cause, and may not be the primary cause.

3) Obama’s comments imply this question: would things have been better overall if the 30,000 troops were in Afghanistan than Iraq? We’ll never know — but a strong argument could be made that the troops would better serve our national interests if they were in the part of the world which is the true center of the war on terror.